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Mobilizations for Western Thrace and Cyprus in Contemporary Turkey: From the Far 
Right to the Lexicon of Human Rights*  
 
This chapter raises the issue of the symbolic and political role of migrants from the Balkans 
in the (re)definition and promotion of contemporary Turkish nationalism. My research mainly 
deals with the mobilization of associations representing the “Turks” from Western Thrace 
(Greece) living in Turkey. They are designated as “Batı Trakyalı” in colloquial Turkish, and I 
will use this term as well in order to avoid any confusion between those who are Greek citizens 
and Turkish citizens.  
In the 1960s and 70s, along with ultranationalist movements, these associations contributed 
to the revival of the myth of the Ottoman Empire’s “lost territories” owing to a “chauvinist and 
aggressive” political context also marked by claims on Cyprus.1 “Lost territories” refer to the 
National Pact adopted in 1920 by the dissident National Assembly in Ankara under the leadership 
of Mustafa Kemal. This assembly rejected the transfer of territories to European countries that 
had been negotiated by the Ottoman government in Istanbul and confirmed by the Treaty of 
Sèvres. Three years later, however, the Ankara Parliament ratified the Treaty of Lausanne, which 
delineated the borders of contemporary Turkey and recognized Western Thrace as a Greek 
province. The compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey was organized by an 
addendum to the Lausanne Treaty, from which the Muslim population of Western Thrace and the 
Orthodox population of Istanbul (and of the Turkish islands Bozcaada and Gökçeada) were 
                                                
* I would like to thank Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel for their helpful comments on the first draft of this paper.  
1 M. Tunçay, “About the First Article of the National Pact,” Birikim, 1976, No. 18-19, p. 12-16 (in Turkish). 
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exempted. They were officially defined as minorities and were granted specific rights for the first 
time in international law2. 
Strictly speaking, the abovementioned National Pact did not make any claims on Western 
Thrace. But nowadays it is commonplace to read in Turkish newspapers that it is “a part of our 
National Pact.” Neither was Cyprus an issue at the end of the Ottoman Empire, whereas it is the 
very embodiment of contemporary nationalism based on the “Turkish world”: namely the 
Balkans, the Caucasus, central Asia, Iraq (Kirkuk) and Cyprus. Moreover, the success of the 
Western Thrace Turks’ mobilization seems to be due to their success in the 1970s in linking this 
issue with that of Cyprus. The EU has become an arbitrator in this issue, since Batı Trakyalı, 
whose representatives in Greece recognize Turkey as a “kin-state,” became European citizens in 
1981.  
My contribution to this volume recounts the different stages of a mobilization that 
accompanied the re-appropriation by official ideology, after the 1980 coup d’état, of the “Turkish 
world” issue that was traditionally promoted by far rightist movements. I will first emphasize the 
way organizations that represent the “Turkish world” gained the status of official interlocutor, in 
spite of Turkish authorities’ strong distrust toward any expression of local cultural identities. 
Indeed, these are considered a kind of “separatism,” particularly in reference to Kurdish cultural 
demands. The Western Thrace Turks Solidarity Association (BTTDD)3 will be presented as a 
case study. The aim is to recount the interactions and negotiations linked to the construction of a 
public issue in a “praetorian regime” in which, especially since the 1960s, the military, supported 
by the high-ranking civil bureaucracy, has exercised “independent political power, either by 
                                                
2 Actes signés à Lausanne le 30janvier et le 24 juillet 1923 et actes signés à Sèvres le 10 août 1920, Paris, 
Imprimerie nationale, 1923. 
3 Batı Trakya Türkleri Dayanışma Derneği, which will be referred to by its acronym. 
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using force or by threatening to do so.”4 In addition, “the military also intervenes in politics via 
its constant presence in the public sphere on the part of the highest reaches of the military 
hierarchy.”5  
As a state-approved association, BTTDD has been granted financial and political support 
by all Turkish governments since its foundation. Its leaders’ speech, claiming it is a “civil society 
organization,” should not lead us to substantiate theories in vogue nowadays in the social 
sciences, according to which “civil society” is a factor of Europeanization and democratization 
challenging “official” political power.6 Neither is BTTDD simply a cog in the machine: the 
interactions between its representatives and Turkish officials are complex and consist of constant 
negotiations, as well as divergent opinions. On the one hand, from the 1960s onwards, it went 
beyond its stated purpose (namely assisting the government in taking in and settling migrants) 
and succeeded in making the Western Thrace issue a part of the Turkish political agenda with 
regard to the “national struggle” (millî dava). On the other hand, in the 1970 and 80s, these 
associations’ connections with several extreme rightist organizations represented a challenge to 
the state’s authority, as well as their obvious connections today with the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP)7. Associations of migrants from the Balkans and Caucasus grouped 
together as federations and confederations, forming a “competitive arena” of “Turks from 
                                                
4 W. Hale, Turkish Military and Politics, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 305. There were three coups between 1960 
and 1980.  
5 A. İnsel, “‘Cet État n’est pas sans propriétaires !’ Forces prétoriennes et autoritarisme en Turquie” in O. Dabène, V. 
Geisser & G. Massardier (eds.) Autoritarismes démocratiques et démocraties autoritaires au 21ème siècle, Paris, La 
Découverte, 2008, p. 3. 
6 For an overview, T. Diez, A. Agnantopoulos & A. Kaliber (eds.) “Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society,” 
South European Society & Politics, 2005, 10 (1): 1-15. For a critical stance, see Y. Navaro-Yashin, “Uses and 
Abuses of ‘State and Civil Society’ in Contemporary Turkey,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 1998, 18: 1-22. 
7 The Muslim conservative party AKP (in power since 2002) is considered by the military and a great part of the civil 
bureaucracy as a threat to the Turkish secularism. In April 2007, the military threatened to use force to prevent 
Abdullah Gül (AKP) from being elected President of the Turkish Republic. Moreover, state-approved associations 
must remain apolitical.  
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abroad” articulated with the political one.8 Thus it is not exact to state that the de-legitimization 
of militant commitments after the 1980 coup d’état has confirmed the “separation between formal 
politics dominated by parties, and civic groups.”9  
This paper will then examine the definition of an international and European strategy for 
promoting the Western Thrace issue in the 1990s, in consultation with state representatives. I will 
emphasize the de facto supervision by the Turkish state over the Western Thrace Turks’ 
mobilizations in different scenes (mainly Germany and Western Thrace), and their abdication of 
their contentious arguments for others based on lobbying for human and minority rights. Unlike 
the literature on “civil society,” I stress the learning and use of a repertoire of European actions 
by actors close to state representatives in order to promote Turkish national interests in Western 
Thrace. “Europe” refers not only to the European Union: norms dealing with human rights 
standards were first defined by the Council of Europe and organizations such as the International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, before becoming in the 1990s a full part of acquis 
communautaire. Consequently, “Europe” has also become part of the vocabulary framing 
political struggle in the Greek-Turkish rivalry.  
 
I. AGENDA SETTING IN A CONTEXT OF POLITICAL RADICALIZATION (1967-80) 
I. The institutionalization of hosting refugees from former Ottoman provinces 
 
Like the various associations of “Turks from abroad,” BTTDD was created in 1946 to 
organize the settlement of migrants and refugees who had fled World War II, and then the Greek 
                                                
8 In 2004, for instance, among the 30 BTTDD representatives to the Rumelian Turks Federation were listed MP 
Mustafa Dündar and Mehmet Müezzinoğlu, president of Istanbul local assembly, both AKP members. 
9 P. Kubicek, “The Earthquake, Civil Society and Political Change in Turkey: Assessment and Comparison With 
Eastern Europe,” Political Studies, 2002, 50 (4): 770. 
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civil war.10 In 1954, along with other mutual aid associations for Balkan migrants, BTTDD 
created the Federation of Turkish Migrants and Refugees Associations, which became a state-
approved organization in 1960. This Federation embodied pan-Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis 
provinces ruled by communists and Greeks. In this respect, the Turkish migratory policy as 
regards Western Thrace has always been ambivalent: In this respect, the Turkish migratory 
policy has always been ambivalent -- considered a “Turkish province” since the end of the 
Ottoman Empire, official immigration from Western Thrace disappeared from the record books 
in the 1960s, though clandestine population movements continue to take place. From the 1970s 
onwards, the privileged relationship between BTTDD and police headquarters has been 
illustrated by the publication in journals connected to the association of precise information 
dealing with illegal immigrants, namely their exact place of origin in Western Thrace, the point 
where they entered Turkey, and a list of persons who were granted Turkish citizenship every 
month.  
Created in 1967, Western Thrace (“Batı Trakya”) was the first journal to promote the Batı 
Trakyalı cause and BTTDD activities, without explicitly being the latter’s organ. But its owner 
and chief editor, Selahattin Yıldız, led the BTTDD twice in the 1970s, and then the Federation of 
Turkish Migrants and Refugees Associations in the 1980s until its dissolution in 1987.11 In this 
journal, and also in the scope of protest actions, Batı Trakyalı activists appropriate themes that 
conform to the official historiography but that are also promoted by far right organizations such 
as the Association for Struggle Against Communism or the National Union of Turkish Students.12 
                                                
10 It was named Western Thrace Migrants Mutual Aid Association until 1969. 
11 BTTDD is nowadays a member of the Rumelian Turks Federation together with the Rumelian Turks Association 
and the Georgian Turks Association. 
12 For an overview, see K. Can “Youth, Turkism and the Extreme Right. The ‘Idealist Hearths’” in S. Yerasimos, G. 
Seufert & K. Vorhoff (eds.) Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism, Istanbul, Orient-Institut /IFEA, 2000, p. 335-
373. 
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Western Thrace reproduces their rhetoric and relates their actions, which are sometimes 
organized in common with BTTDD members.13 One has to keep in mind the context of the 1960 
and 70s, where political life was strongly polarized between far rightist and leftist movements 
leading to a quasi civil war, put to an end by the 1980 coup d’état.  
I.2. Re-definition of the “national struggle” 
 
In the same vein as the pan-Turkist rhetorical flaying of the “enemies of the Turkish 
nation,” Western Thrace’s content was virulent towards Armenians and “Rum,”  (Greek speaking 
orthodox Christians) be they from Istanbul, Cyprus or Greece. During the 1960s, a decade of 
“fragmentation and radicalisation,” the Kemalist doctrine was “challenged by new ideologies and 
social projects.”14 In 1969, the Party of Nationalist Action (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) wad 
founded by Alparslan Türkeş, who popularized the idea of a “Turco-Islamic synthesis”15 and a 
Turkish nation transcending contemporary Turkey’s borders. His movement clearly influenced 
Western Thrace Turks’ identity mobilization, both in Turkey and Germany in the 1980s.  
In this journal, there were various ways of linking the issues of Western Thrace and 
Cyprus. Firstly, Western Thrace, reprinted official petitions signed by BTTDD leaders and 
addressed to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister or military authorities.16 In 1967, 
for instance, after the military junta came to power in Athens, the Association of Immigrants 
from Western Thrace (later BTTDD) petitioned President Cevdet Sunay to have “Western Thrace 
                                                
13 See for instance (in Turkish), “Statement of the Association for Struggle Against Communism”, Batı Trakya, No. 
4, August 1967; “Prayers in memory of the martyrs of the War of Independence”, Batı Trakya, No. 5, September 
1967. 
14 H. Bozarslan, Histoire de la Turquie contemporaine, op.cit., p. 56. 
15 A nationalist ideology considering Islam as an integral part of the Turkish identity. MHP is nowadays the third 
political force in Turkey. 
16 “Telegrams”, Batı Trakya, No. 90, October 1974 (in Turkish). See also A. G. Altınay & T. Bora, “Army, 
Militarism and Nationalism” in T. Bora (ed.) Political Thought in Modern Turkey…, op.cit., p. 140-154 (in Turkish). 
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and Cyprus saved together.”17 After the 1974 Cyprus crisis, similar telegrams were sent to the 
Prime Minister and military officers in order to denounce Greek retaliatory measures against 
Turks in Western Thrace. Indeed, Turkish military staff seemed to show a growing interest in the 
Western Thrace issue. Since the 1970 and 80s, staff officers’ interventions as experts in BTTDD 
journals or in conferences on the “Turkish world” have become commonplace. Appeals for 
military intervention then became clearer in Western Thrace journal, as illustrates, for example, 
an article published in January 1975, “Western Thrace front in Cyprus’s peace operation.”18 
Secondly, narrative and semantic processes were used in order to connect events that occurred in 
Western Thrace and in Cyprus, such as simultaneously occurring deaths, even if no true link 
existed between them.19 The national press in Turkey also tended to conflate these two situations 
when the junta came to power in Athens.20  
On the other hand, a separate semantic process aimed at appropriating the expression 
“national struggle.” It was first used in reference to Cyprus by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
in the 1950s and has then become a constant and preponderant element of the official rhetoric on 
that issue.21 The “national cause” or “struggle”22 adopted by BTTDD leaders concerning Western 
Thrace is omnipresent in Western Thrace journal’s writings from the 1970s onwards, and also in 
the interviews I conducted with the association’s representatives.  The consequences of the 1974 
conflict in Cyprus actually did in a way back up Batı Trakyalı militants in Turkey, since the 
                                                
17 “Telegrams from the Western Thrace Immigrants Mutual Aid Association”, Batı Trakya, No. 8, December 1967 
(in Turkish). Cevdet Sunay was himself a former staff officer and he approved the 1971 military Coup. See H. 
Bozarslan, Histoire de la Turquie contemporaine, op.cit., p. 59. 
18 “Western Thrace front in Cyprus’s peace operation”, Batı Trakya, No. 93, January 1975 (in Turkish). “Peace 
operation” is the official expression used to name what is considered by international law as the military invasion of 
Northern Cyprus by Turkish army in 1974, after the failure of the coup d’état planed by Makarios and the Greek 
junta.   
19 “Two Turks were killed in Cyprus and Western Thrace”, Batı Trakya, No. 3, July 1967 (in Turkish). 
20 “Turks in Western Thrace and Cyprus”, Batı Trakya, No. 4, August 1967 (in Turkish), based on an article 
published in Sabah daily newspaper. 
21 G. T. Alpkaya, “Nationalism in ‘Turkish Foreign Policy’” in T. Bora (ed.) Political Thought in Modern 
Turkey…op.cit., p. 155-167 (in Turkish). 
22 In Turkish, it has the double meaning of cause and struggle, but also of trial. 
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Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus had strong repercussions on Western Thrace Turks’ 
everyday life: considered a threat, they were subject to a curfew during several months and their 
hunting weapons were seized.  
I.3. Protest action following in far right’s wake 
 
At its beginning, Western Thrace merely recounted the demonstrations organized by 
nationalist rightist groups, such as the Nation Union of Turkish Students,23 which claimed a 
military intervention in Cyprus.24 These articles’ titles and content often refer to the Kemalist 
vulgate establishing youth as the guardian of the “Eternal Chief’s” heritage. This vulgate was 
appropriated by military staff who decided the 1960 coup and in the following decade by the 
different rightist and leftist factions confronted to the civil government’s political and economic 
mediocrity.25  
According to Western Thrace’s archives, there was a turning point on April 13, 1974, when 
several Batı Trakyalı took part in such a demonstration for the first time. Nevertheless, BTTDD 
was not officially involved in this demonstration organized by the National Union of Turkish 
Students aiming at “warning Greeks,” while the situation in Cyprus was becoming worse.26 The 
report’s author notes that he met several acquaintances whose “national consciousness” was 
“finally born.” Three days earlier,27 according to a mode of action that would be frequently used 
in the 1980s by BTTDD leaders, the National Union of Turkish Students’ leader placed a funeral 
                                                
23 This organization used to illustrate the most radical pan-Turkist nationalism. It gave birth to the movement 
“Cyprus is Turkish” and disappeared after joining the Islamist Party of National Salvation in 1969.  
24 “Turkish youth has had its voice heard in meetings organized in Istanbul and Ankara”, Batı Trakya, No. 7, 
November 1967 (in Turkish). 
25 H. Bozarslan, Histoire de la Turquie contemporaine, op.cit., p. 53-64 
26 “Beyazıt square in Istanbul experienced a historical day”, Batı Trakya, No. 84, April 1974 (in Turkish). One of the 
Western Thrace movement’s leaders, Ahmet Aydınlı, made a speech “on behalf of the Batı Trakyalı.” He published 
in 1971 a satire entitled Western Thrace’s disaster, which made him known as an intellectual of the Western Thrace 
cause. He was also president of BTTDD between 1981 and 1984.  
27 In the context of a negotiation breakdown in Cyprus on April 9th.  
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wreath in front of the Greek consulate in Istanbul which bore the following inscription: “Have 
you forgotten September 9th?”, referring to the date of the capture of Smyrna in 1922, the symbol 
of the Greek presence in Minor Asia, after Mustafa Kemal’s army defeated Greek invasion on 
August 30. Afterwards the crowd stood and sang the national anthem, and then scattered. One 
can see in the accompanying picture a group of persons wearing hoods: they were allegedly 
young Batı Trakyalı with Greek citizenship, fearing retaliation against themselves or their 
families if Greek authorities learned of their participation in this meeting.28  
This statement could not be  fully verified, but interviews conducted with Batı Trakyalı of 
Greek citizenship who studied in Turkey – be it in the 1970s or in the 1990s –suggest a desire to 
avoid political mobilization in order not to draw the attention of either the Greek or Turkish 
authorities. One of my interlocutors had to interrupt his studies in the 1970s after he was expelled 
from Turkey for publicly claiming his sympathy for extreme leftist movements. Until recently, 
studying in Turkey was, for most of this population, the sole path toward social mobility. 
Besides, political issues related to Turkey often do not make sense for people who grew up in 
Greece. And, in any case, the aforementioned demonstrations do not seem to have been designed 
to mobilize Batı Trakyalı students or residents. In the classic manner of collective action, they 
were very likely organized to show the positioning of the associations of “Turks from abroad” 
within extreme right movements and to negotiate the latter’s high profile in the Turkish political 
arena.  
I.4. Institutional mobilization and emergence of specific demands  
 
These affirmations are reinforced by the fact that BTTDD leaders seem to have favored 
establishing close relationships with state representatives, to the detriment of protest actions. 
                                                
28 “Wreath deposit at consulate’s door and meeting illustrate demonstrators’ maturity,” Batı Trakya, No. 84, April 
1974 (in Turkish). 
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They would in particular send delegations to Ankara to address the Prime Minister or the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs about the situation of “Turks” in Western Thrace. Behind the 
rhetorical facade designed to appeal to Turkish interest in the region, the associations’ purpose 
was to heighten government awareness of Batı Trakyalı settled in Turkey without being blamed 
for promoting cultural identities at the expense of national unity.  
The first of these delegations recounted in Western Thrace journal, in 1968, was dismissed 
by both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Interior.29 This failure may 
illustrate the government’s caution towards an association whose political commitment was 
obvious, whereas an important agreement providing for teacher exchange in minority schools was 
to be signed with Greece the same year. Yet BTTDD representatives succeeded two years later: 
they were received by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and the person in charge of the Balkans 
committee in the Ministry for Foreign affairs.30 Those visits became a kind of ritual aiming at 
reaffirming Batı Trakyalı’s allegiance towards Turkish governments: one of them occurred on the 
pretext of congratulating Bülent Ecevit’s government when it took office in 1974.31 After 
establishing such ties, demands shifted from the situation of “Turks” in Greece to the one of Batı 
Trakyalı living in Turkey: having the right to purchase property in Turkey and have an activity in 
trade and business sectors; and also the softening of procedures to be granted Turkish 
citizenship.32  
A few months before the 1980 coup, even though there had been no significant Batı 
Trakyalı immigration to Cyprus, a Cyprus and Western Thrace Turks Solidarity Association was 
                                                
29 “Contacts of the board of the Association of Immigrants from Western Thrace in Ankara”, Batı Trakya, No. 14, 
June 1968 (in Turkish). 
30 “The association’s board was received by our Prime Minister, Mr. Demirel”, Batı Trakya, n°37, May 1970 (in 
Turkish).  
31 “Contacts of the associations’ leaders in Ankara”, Batı Trakya, n°83, March 1974 (in Turkish). 
32 “The claims of Western Thrace Turks living in Turkey but who still have Greek citizenship”, Batı Trakya, n°85, 
May 1974 (in Turkish). 
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founded in Nicosia.33 It was BTTDD’s twin organization led by Fikret Alasya, an ultranationalist 
Cypriot intellectual close to Rauf Denktaş. After the 1974 “peace operation,” he became the 
representative in Cyprus of the Turkish Ministry of Defense.34 Many of my interlocutors among 
BTTDD representatives deny the fact that such an association existed. The legitimacy of Batı 
Trakyalı’s political and (Turkish) identity speech is indeed based on the assurance that such an 
identity claim will never open the door to secessionist thought or to any Turkish territorial 
demand concerning Greece. It is all the more important that Turkey’s presence in Cyprus is 
considered a military occupation from the point of view of international law. After the 1980 
coup, unlike most political parties and associations, BTTDD was not banned but had to leave its 
activities in abeyance. In the following months, in accordance with a decision of General Kenan 
Evren, some 6,000 Batı Trakyalı who were living in Turkey – many of them illegally – became 
Turkish citizens.35 Taking advantage of the favorable context for the “Turks from outside,” 
BTTDD claimed the creation of a “directorate general” dedicated to them, attached to the Prime 
Minister.36 It is a fact that currently there is not only a vice Prime Minister but also state 
secretaries and state representatives at the local level who are in charge of the “Turkish world.”37  
                                                
33 “The anniversary of the Association of Western Thrace and Cyprus Turks association was celebrated”, Batı 
Trakya, n°169, May 1981 (in Turkish). 
34 “Turks from Cyprus and Western Thrace”, Batı Trakya, n°209, September 1984 (in Turkish). 
35 “6000 Batı Trakyalı fellowcountrymen are granted Turkish citizenship”, Batı Trakya, n°167, March 1981 (in 
Turkish). 
36 “A Directorate General for the Turks from abroad depending on Prime Minister should be created”, Batı Trakya, 
n°168, April 1981 (in Turkish). 
37 N. Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, “The Associations of Migrants from Rumelia and Balkan in Turkey’s Balkan Policy: 
Expectations, Roles and Problems” in Civil Society Organizations and Turkish Foreign Policy, İstanbul, Marmara 
University editions, 2005, p. 9 (in Turkish).  
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II. SINCE 1980, A STATE-SPONSORED MOBILIZATION TOWARDS THE MUSLIM WORLD 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION  
II.1. The disowning of the ultranationalist right and the “official” demonstrations in the 1980s 
 
Despite the fact that movements involved in the violent riots of the former years were 
banned and that the extreme right leader Alparslan Türkeş was imprisoned, the Turco-Islamic 
synthesis he had promoted became a quasi-ideology of the state. On the other hand, the cult of 
Mustafa Kemal was simultaneously strengthened38 and “Turks from abroad” was henceforth 
officially recognized as a “national cause.” Consequently, the BTTDD’s ideological line evolved 
during the 1980s. Allegiance rituals to Atatürk were scrupulously observed, and one could note a 
shift in meaning: BTTDD meetings were no longer punctuated by a reading from the Koran but 
by the placing of a spray of flowers at the feet of a sculpture of Atatürk.39  
The military returned power to civilians in 1983 after writing a new constitution allowing 
officers to exercise power in political life and over citizens’ personal freedom, especially 
concerning the right to demonstrate. At that time, BTTDD officially took part in street 
demonstrations that were obviously state-approved. On March 21, 1985, a demonstration was 
organized in Istanbul by several associations representing different “Turkish nations” – including 
the BTTDD – in support of the Turks in Bulgaria. This demonstration, reportedly gathering 
 200,000 persons, had received approval from the police headquarters, which had forwarded the 
application to the First Army and Martial Law Commander.40 Considering the way Turkish 
authorities apply Law 2911/1983 on meetings and demonstrations – most of them are actually 
                                                
38 E. Copeaux, Espaces et temps de la nation turque, Paris, CNRS, 1997 p. 81. The author reminds us that until the 
1980 coup, textbooks’ covers did not even bear the effigy of Atatürk. 
39 “Our ordinary assembly gathered in an atmosphere of great maturity”, Batı Trakya, n°158, June 1980 (in Turkish).  
40 “Protest meeting against Bulgaria will take place on 21st March”, Batı Trakya, No. 215, March 1985 (in Turkish). 
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illegal – one may assume that the demonstrations they permit are welcome by the government.41 
In contrast to street demonstrations in the former period, this time BTTDD leaders walked at the 
procession’s head and the Western Thrace’s editor in chief, also president of the Federation of 
Turkish Immigrants and Refugees Associations, led the demonstration’s organizing committee.42  
In these demonstrations, the most contentious dimension is often the least important one, as 
the following examples show. In 1989, the BTTDD organized a sit-in in front of the İpsala 
bridge-border between Greece and Turkey to protest the measures taken by Greek authorities to 
prevent Batı Trakyalı living in Turkey from voting in general elections. This protest action 
remained symbolic: after a declaration from the president of the BTTDD, 35 persons sat down for 
a time before leaving.43 To put it differently, although protest actions are organized as a 
retaliation against Greek policy towards “Turks” in Western Thrace, they actually address 
Turkish authorities. Along with the laying of funeral wreaths, a protest action which is often 
referred to in Western Thrace, some protest practices confirm the will of the Batı Trakyalı to 
place their struggle against the “Greek oppressor” within Turkey’s republican heritage, thereby 
avoiding any interaction with Greek authorities. In November 1989, for instance, during Sadık 
Ahmet’s trial in Thessaloniki,44 the procession’s target in Istanbul was not the Greek consulate as 
it was usually, but rather the monument dedicated to the Republic’s glory in Taksim square. This 
                                                
41 A. Uysal, “Maintien de l’ordre et risques liés aux manifestation de rue” in G. Dorronsoro (ed.) La Turquie 
conteste. Mobilisations sociales et regime sécuritaire, Paris, CNRS, 2005, p. 36. 
42 “A huge protest meeting against Bulgaria”, Batı Trakya, No. 216, April 1985 (in Turkish).  
43 “Protest against Greece at border”, Batı Trakya, No. 257, Oct.-Dec. 1989 (in Turkish). Between 1989 and 1993, 
because of the emergence of independent ‘Turkish’ MPs in Western Thrace, Greek authorities used to prevent buses 
coming from Turkey from crossing the border just before elections.  
44 The first Batı Trakyalı to be elected MP without being affiliated to a Greek political party, he was a leading figure 
of the Turkish identity movement in Western Thrace. He was tried for “Turkish propaganda” during his electoral 
campaigns. He is also famous for his connections with extreme right wing movements in Turkey (1949-1995).  
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highly symbolic monument celebrates the day Allied troops left Istanbul in 1923 and can be 
reached only by demonstrations approved by authorities.45 
Strikingly, the “ruder” a demonstration is, the less it addresses the authorities. When violent 
means are used, it is not against Greek or Turkish authorities but rather against Christian Turkish 
citizens, considered enemies of the Turkish nation by people in nationalist milieus.46 For five 
days in 1991, demonstrators laid siege to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. The BTTDD 
instigated the demonstration; its aim was to protest the promulgation of a new law in Greece that 
cancelled the provisions of Law 2345/1920 concerning the election of muftis’ in Western Thrace. 
Although not officially sanctioned, the demonstration was reportedly accepted in a tacit way by 
police headquarters. Policemen contented themselves with preventing Grey Wolves activists47 
from approaching the Patriarchate, and refused to scatter demonstrators who blocked 
Patriarchate’s entry. The police chief of the Fatih district – where the Patriarchate is located – is 
said to have supported demonstrators.48 The BTTDD president wanted the Patriarchate to 
denounce the Greek law; he exhorted him to cooperate and prove he could be a good citizen, in 
other words, a loyal Turkish citizen even though he was Christian.49 My interlocutors justified the 
connivance with policemen arguing they were fighting for the “national cause,” which was 
acknowledged by police headquarters. As a matter of fact, the protest action was not motivated 
by the defense of Batı Trakyalı rights in Greece, but rather the re-affirmation of Turkey’s far 
rightist credo in reaction to an attempt to the “Turkish” minority’s status such as defined in 1923. 
                                                
45 For example, for the first time since 1977, trade union demonstrations on May 1st were allowed to reach this 
monument in 2009. “A sensible end: a consequence of strong bargaining, certainly, but 1st May was celebrated at 
Taksim square for the first time since 1978”, Radikal, 02.05. 2009 (in Turkish). 
46 Examples of this hate’s climax include the events of September 6-7, 1955; the murder of journalist Hrant Dink in 
2007; and the fact several priests have been murdered in Turkey in the last few years.  
47 They are a branch of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Interview with the former president of a BTTDD local 
branch who took part to the blockade, February 2004. Another former BTTDD leader related this demonstration 
being very proud of what happened, July 2003. 
48 Vemund Aarbakke, “The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace,” PhD dissertation, Bergen University, 2000, p. 519. 
49 Ibid., p. 520, referring to extreme rightist daily newspaper Türkiye, 27. 08.1991. 
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The quasi official character of those demonstrations is a contrario confirmed by the banning of 
another demonstration planned in Istanbul in January 1988 on the BTTDD’s initiative on the 
occasion of the Davos bilateral conference aiming at sealing friendship between Greece and 
Turkey.50 This demonstration was supposed to take place to echo one organized in Western 
Thrace on January 29 as a protest against the court decision banning associations that bore the 
adjective “Turkish” in their name.51 
Over the course of the 1980s, the various protest actions listed here began to be organized 
in reaction to precise events occurring in Western Thrace, rather than in accordance with political 
parties or other organizations of “Turks from abroad.” During this period, connections 
strengthened within the network of Batı Trakyalı network between Germany, Western Thrace and 
Turkey, leading to a broader convergence of agendas and modes of action.52 This is related to the 
definition of a European strategy, to which I will return below. 
II.2. Appeal to the Islamic Conference Organization 
 
Before turning to the EU, Western Thrace promoters appealed for support from “Muslim 
and sister countries.” In the official lexicon, this expression refers to a hierarchy and a degree of 
proximity with neighboring “peoples” or “countries” according to whether they adhere to Islam 
(in that case they are “friends”) or belong to the “great Turkish family” (in which case they are 
“sisters”). Until 1983 and the revival of BTTDD activities, the Cyprus and Western Thrace Turks 
Solidarity Association was in charge of the defense of Batı Trakyalı’s cause. It seems that its 
                                                
50 “Protest meeting against Greece was cancelled”, Batı Trakya, No. 250, February 1988 (in Turkish). 
51 B. Oran, The Western Thrace issue in Greek-Turkish relations, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991 [1986] (in Turkish). 
52 J. Hersant, “Mobilisations politique, co-gouvernementalité, construction ethnique. Sociologie du nationalisme turc 
à travers le cas des Turcs de Thrace occidentale (Grèce, Allemagne, Turquie)”, unpublished PhD thesis, (EHESS, 
Paris, 2007). 
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efforts were particularly dedicated to the strategy of internationalization53 and at first mainly 
directed towards the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO).54 That was the association president 
Fikret Alasya’s idea, in accordance with the credo of Turkey’s ruling figure, General Kenan 
Evren.55 Linking together Turks of Cyprus and Western Thrace– both of whom were portrayed as 
victims of the Greeks – was a way of making acceptable the 1983 proclamation of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the island’s de facto partition for the Turkish 
government. But ICO is only concerned with Muslim populations, and the organization would 
find it out of the question to promote the “Turkish world.”56 Worse, the ICO never officially 
recognized the TRNC.57 
On the other hand, at the end of 1980s, BTTDD leaders became aware of the European 
dimension of the Western Thrace minority issue thanks to the ties they developed with Batı 
Trakyalı associations in Germany. The semantic register of human rights was gradually 
superimposed on that of Turkish nationalism, both in official and BTTDD speeches.  
II.3. The adoption of the language of human rights and expertise in the framework of the EU 
(1990s) 
 
The European strategy was defined by Batı Trakyalı actors in Turkey at the end of the 
1980s. It coincides with the launching of the BTTDD’s new journal, The Voice of Western 
Thrace (Batı Trakya’nın Sesi) in 1987. Considering the erratic publication of Western Thrace 
                                                
53 “The anniversary of the foundation of the Cyprus and Western Thrace Turks Solidarity Association was 
celebrated”, op.cit.; “A new directorship was elected during our annual general meeting”, op.cit. 
54 See, in Turkish: “A diplomatic note sent to Islamic Conference” Batı Trakya, No. 145, May 1979; “Western 
Thrace Turks attend the meeting of Foreign Affairs ministers at the Islamic Conference”, Batı Trakya’nın Sesi, No. 
9, March-April 1989; “Western Thrace Turks attend Islamic Conference”, Batı Trakya’nın Sesi No. 18-20, 1990; 
“Islamic Conference Organization stand up for Western Thrace Turks”, Batı Trakya’nın Sesi No. 37, December 
1991.  
55 “Cyprus and Western Thrace Turks”, Batı Trakya, n°209, September 1984 (in Turkish). 
56 This is valid a fortiori for ‘Turks’ in Iraq, to Panturkist militants’ great displeasure: “Mufti of Xanthi was invited 
in Iraq”, Batı Trakya, No. 160, August 1980 (in Turkish). 
57 G. Bertrand, Les mutations du conflit helléno-turc, Paris, Maisonneuve & Larose, 2004, p. 239. 
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between 1987 and 1989 before it died out, as well as the tone and contents of some of the last 
articles published, it seems that its owner was gradually disavowed by the BTTDD leadership. 
This, coupled with the banning of a rival journal, The New Western Thrace (Yeni Batı Trakya), 
illustrates the ambivalence of the BTTDD’s political line. Created in 1983, this second journal 
became the BTTDD’s instrument: as the publication of official information from police 
headquarters previously published in Western Thrace suggests. This second journal’s owner, 
Süleyman Sefer Ciahn, was a member of the BTTDD board between 1981 and 1984 until he was 
dismissed, apparently because of his sympathies with extreme rightist movements.58 
The Voice of Western Thrace was created in 1987 as the BTTDD’s official publication after 
the infighting between the two former ones. It displays an intellectual ambition to break – at least 
formally – with the militant rightist line of Western Thrace and The New Western Thrace. After 
finding resources in the 1960s and 1970s thanks to radical rightist organizations’ rhetoric and 
know-how, the BTTDD was thereafter forced to maintain a non-political stand. The new 
journal’s tone is far less virulent compared to former publications and its articles concentrate on 
Western Thrace, relinquishing the Cyprus issue and denunciation of the Turkish nation’s “inner 
enemies.” From then on, even Western Thrace stopped mentioning the Cyprus and Western 
Thrace Turks Solidarity Association, although Fikret Alasya was one of its regular columnists 
throughout the 1980s. As for Rauf Denktaş, President of the TRNC between 1983 and 2005, he 
remains an honorary member of the BTTDD. 
                                                
58 He is now a sympathizer of İşçi Partisi (Workers Party), an ultra-nationalist organization mobilized in particular 
for the Cyprus issue. The president of The New Western Thrace’s editorial board since 2003 is retired general Veli 
Küçük, who was in 2008 one of the main defendants in the trial of the sub-state organization Ergenekon. Gathering 
officers, politicians and journalists, this ultra-nationalist organization was suspected of journalist Hrant Dink’s 
assassination and of planning a coup d’état. See for instance, “’Deep state plot’ grips Turkey”, BBC News, 4 
February 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7225889.stm. 
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This turning point was illustrated by what Prof. Kemal Karpat said in the first issue of The 
Voice of Western Thrace as a member of its academic board. The famous historian encouraged 
the Batı Trakyalı to publish abundantly in Greek and English, and to not only address their claims 
to the Turkish people. He suggests that they should resort to international organizations: “One 
has to choose precise and influential targets: Amnesty International, European Parliament, 
OECD, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (…) just as the Bulgarian Turks did.”59 Kemal 
Karpat also encouraged the Batı Trakyalı to invest themselves in academic conferences and 
research centers specializing on South-Eastern Europe that were emerging in Europe and the 
United States. Throughout the 1980s, the BTTDD did indeed invest heavily in creating expertise 
in this field, although mainly from the “Turkish world” perspective.60  
The underlying logic was to shift the Batı Trakyalı issue from Turkish nationalism to the 
framework of human and minority rights. For example, the famous journalist Mümtaz Soysal, at 
a conference on the “Turkish world” organized by the BTTDD, lamented the fact “we pay dearly 
for not using in due time, according to our own point of view, such a fashionable theme [as 
minority rights] that entered the world by our door.”61 These words allude to the suspicion 
engendered in Turkey by human rights, the promotion of which is closely connected to minority 
rights for several reasons. First, historically, “national liberation” struggles by Christian 
minorities that weakened the declining Ottoman Empire were supported by European countries – 
especially France and England – hoping to take control of strategic Ottoman provinces.62 Now, 
                                                
59 “About Western Thrace, with Professor Kemal Karpat”, Batı Trakya’nın Sesi, No. 1, November-December 1987. 
Helsinki Watch also published in a famous report in 1991 that contributed to publicizing Western Thrace Turks. The 
writing of this report is said to have been suggested by Turkish officials as a  riposte to a report on the situation of 
Kurds in Turkey. 
60 J. Hersant, 2007, op.cit. 
61 Mümtaz Soysal quoted in “A panel of experts on Greek-Turkish relations, Lausanne Treaty and Western Thrace 
Turks”, Batı Trakya’nın Sesi, No. 1, November-December 1987 (in Turkish). 
62 T. Akçam, “Another History on Sèvres and Lausanne” in H- Kieser & D. J. Schaller (eds.) The Armenian 
Genocide and the Shoah, Zürich, Chronos Verlag, 2nd edition, 2003, p. 281-299.  
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these struggles took place in the name of political liberalism and the rights of minorities.63 
Second, the minorities issue in Turkey became internationally oriented from 1984 onwards with 
the establishment of the guerrilla party PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) opposing the Turkish 
army. Last but not least, the protection of “ethnic” or “national” minorities has indeed become 
one of the EU’s main systems of reference, along with state law, since the collapse of former 
Yugoslavia and the revival of the “Balkan powder keg.” As a matter of fact, influenced by the 
repercussions of the 1990 Helsinki Watch’s report on Western Thrace,64 the EU has come to 
acknowledge Batı Trakyalı actors’ claims and now advocates the recognition of a Turkish 
minority by Greece –not a Muslim one – in Western Thrace. This European injunction led to the 
redefinition of the political lexicon and to an evolution in the repertoire of actions used within the 
Batı Trakyalı identity movement. 
II.4. Abandoning the language of protest  
 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the political language of human rights had not yet been 
developed or mastered by Batı Trakyalı associations in Turkey, whereas the actions implemented 
by associations in Germany opened up new forms of mobilization and a new semantic register: 
that of the European Union. Throughout 1980s and 1990s, these associations organized several 
demonstrations and, in parallel, sent delegations to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. After 
the violent events in 1990 in Komotini,65 there were no more demonstrations for the rights of the 
“Turkish” minority in Greece. Between 1982 and 1997, six street demonstrations in Germany, 
one in Great Britain and one in France (Strasbourg) occurred. They were all organized in 
                                                
63Idem, “A Few Theses About Turkish National Identity” in T. Bora (ed.) Political Thought in Modern 
Turkey…op.cit, p. 53-62. 
64 L. Whitman, “Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks in Western Thrace”, Helsinki Watch Report, 1990. 
65 Street demonstrations in 1990 led to the ransacking of Turkish shops, mosques and houses by Greek rightist 
activists. 
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response to events in Western Thrace, except for one in 1986 that was organized by a “Turkish 
organization”66 to protest against Bulgaria’s policy towards its Turkish minority. This 
mobilization was organized in cooperation with the identity movement in Western Thrace, and 
soon came to be seen as a good means to promote “Turkishness” there. Moreover, since the end 
of 1980s, Turkish authorities and the BTTDD actors have gradually become involved in 
associations in Germany by choosing or co-opting their leaders.67   
The movement away from protest actions was enunciated during the 4th Western Thrace 
Turks International Conference, which took place in June 2000 in London. The goal was to put 
the Western Thrace Turks Federation in Europe in the forefront, rather than the BTTDD, whose 
members are mainly Turkish citizens. The BTTDD and Turkish officials were nevertheless well 
represented,68 and the rhetoric linking Cyprus and Western Thrace was reaffirmed. The means of 
action recommended during this conference emphasized conducting a lobbying strategy towards 
the European Union. In a context where the Greek state was blamed by Turkey and the United 
States for offering PKK militants protection and logistical support,69 the strategy adopted by Batı 
Trakyalı actors stressed the non-violent and sophisticated character of their own demands. The 
representative of the Helsinki Monitoring Committee in Greece, also a representative of the 
Turkish identity movement, argued that “we shall not demonstrate and shout in the streets any 
more; otherwise the Greek media will condemn us as a fanatic group.”70  
The abandonment of the language of protest coincided with shifting the European 
mobilization’s center toward Western Thrace. Such an evolution is linked to the changes in the 
                                                
66 “Protest march against Bulgaria in Düsseldorf,” Yeni Batı Trakya, No. 34, 1986. The march (which is said to have 
gathered 5,000 persons) is recounted by one of the participants who does not name the “Turkish organization.” 
67 J. Hersant, 2007, op.cit. 
68 The symposium’s proceedings were printed by the BTTDD main branch in Bursa. 
69 Its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was arrested in February 1999 in the Greek embassy in Nairobi where he had sought 
asylum.  
70 “Speeches, Commission Reports, Conclusions”, 4th International Western Thrace Turks Conference, 16-18 June 
2000, London, Bursa, BTTDD (in Turkish). 
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social characteristics of the identity movement’s entrepreneurs in Western Thrace, and their 
cooperation with second-generation migrants in Germany. Unlike the first-generation migrants 
who launched the European mobilization, these tend to be young people who have graduated 
from Turkey’s universities, and sometimes even hold Masters degrees obtained in Germany or 
Great Britain. They speak perfect English (and Greek for the youth in Western Thrace) and have 
skills related to the field of human rights intervention: they have considerable knowledge of 
international norms concerning the rights of minorities, know-how regarding lobbying 
techniques, and an understanding of the various European institutions. They are also well 
integrated in the forums dedicated to the promotion of the rights of minorities. In fact, they are 
both experts and militants of their own cause. 
In 2000, the Western Thrace Turks Federation in Europe was granted a consultative status 
in the UN Economic and Social Committee. And the Association of Graduates from the Muslim 
Minority in Western Thrace has conducted several projects with Minority Rights Group (MRG, 
London): for example, writing an English-language “UN guide for minorities.” This guide was 
then translated into Turkish and distributed both in Western Thrace and Turkey. This second part 
of the project did not involve MRG but rather the Turkish consulate in Komotini, one of the most 
powerful, although there are no Turkish citizens in Western Thrace. Unlike former protest 
actions, the lobbying strategy that has been implemented for the last ten years systematically 
bypasses Greek authorities: it addresses European representatives, never Greek MPs or MEPs.  
Conclusion 
 
In this study of the politicization of the Batı Trakyalı issue – namely its reformulation into a 
public issue first in the Turkish national framework and then on the European scale – I tried to 
follow the methodological approach suggested by Siméant: “clarifying the nature of links 
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between protagonists, specifying what leads actors and organizations to internationalization, and 
studying the possible transformation of protest forms.”71 The nature of the Batı Trakyalı 
movement challenges the conventional approach to social movements, which opposes “ordinary 
people” to either authorities or “powerful opponents.”72 In this case, it seems that the more access 
activists have to state institutions, the more aggressive  their demonstrations are and the less they 
address Greek authorities. In a similar manner, the category of “transnational social movements” 
fails to distinguish between contentious actions and lobbying, which can be intertwined.73 That is 
why it seems more appropriate to consider Batı Trakyalı activists a “transnational network of 
militants,”74 or an “advocacy coalition,”75 in which NGOs or state administrations can be 
involved as well. 
As for the appropriation of human rights lexicon, it might at first sight appear as the 
illustration of the first step in the “norms socialization” process such as stressed by Risse & Alii, 
namely “instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining.”76 But this model, as well as the 
distinction on which it is based between “Western” and “liberal” states on the one hand, and 
states that do not respect human rights on the other hand, is just not relevant. It stresses the 
external pressure on states due to “domestic opposition” resorting to “international human rights 
NGOs/organizations” and to “Western powers.”77 Notwithstanding the fact that “NGOs” and 
“transnational advocacy networks” – which are supposed to bypass state authority – are often 
                                                
71 J. Siméant, “Des mouvements nouveaux et globaux? Sur les mouvements sociaux ‘transnationaux’ dans quelques 
ouvrages récents,” Congrès de l’Association Française de Science Politique, 2005,  
http://www.afsp.msh-paris.fr/archives/congreslyon2005/lyon2005.html. 
72 S. Tarrow, Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, 2nd edition, p. 2. 
73 J. Siméant, op.cit. 
74 S. Tarrow, “La contestation transnationale,” Cultures & Conflits, 2000, 38-39: 208. 
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77 Ibid., p. 19 
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totally or partially state-sponsored organizations78 (like the BTTDD), this schema does not fit 
here. In their desire to “evaluate” human rights practices, these authors do not take into account 
the uses or bypassing of international norms, even by states that claim to uphold international 
law.79   
More relevant is Sikkink’s and Dezalay and Garth’s analysis stressing the emergence of 
human rights between 1970 and the 1990s as a central element of American foreign policy,80 and 
therefore as a universal reference in the “international field of practices.”81 From this point of 
view, the process of European construction involves both prescriptive and ideological aspects: it 
was able to prescribe a common and relatively stable perception of values such as democracy, 
human rights, law state, and citizenship. Besides, the process of Greece’s European integration 
has often been considered as a moment in the country’s “democratic transition” following which 
it has reached “Western standards.” This is the reason why, although it is not an EU member, the 
Turkish state makes good use of European norms dealing with national minorities in order to 
legitimate its sovereignty over the “Turkish” minority in Western Thrace. Consequently, it 
succeeded in promoting its own interests concerning a European territory (Western Thrace), 
whereas its military occupation of Northern Cyprus has been strongly opposed by European 
Union. 
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